August 22, 2012 at 00:02:56
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War fever as seen from Iran
By Pepe Escobar (about the author)
Cross-posted from
Asia Times

Absent the possibility of
joining the Curiosity rover on Mars, there's
nowhere to hide from the "Bomb Iran" hysteria
relentlessly emanating from Tel Aviv and its
Washington outposts. Now that even includes
third-rate hacks suggesting US President Barack
Obama should go in person to Israel to appease the
warmongering duo Bibi-Barak[1].
So it's
time for something completely different -- and
totally absent from Western corporate media; sound
Iranian minds rationally analyzing what's really
going on behind the drums of war -- regarding Iran,
Turkey, the Arab world and across Eurasia.
Let's start with ambassador Hossein
Mousavian, a research scholar at Princeton
University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, a former spokesperson for
the Iranian nuclear negotiating team from 2003 to
2005, and the author of The Iranian Nuclear
Crisis: A Memoir.
Writing at the Arms
Control Association website[2], Mousavian goes
straight to the point; "The history of Iran's
nuclear program suggests that the West is
inadvertently pushing Iran toward nuclear
weapons."
In seven key steps, he outlines
how this happened -- starting with Iran's "entrance
into the nuclear field," owed largely, by the way,
to Washington; "In the 1970s, the Shah [of Iran]
had ambitious plans for expanding the nuclear
program, envisioning 23 nuclear power plants by
1994, with support from the United States."
Mousavian stresses how, from 2003 to 2005,
during the first Bush administration...
"Iran submitted different [nuclear]
proposals, which included a declaration to cap
enrichment at the 5% level; export all
low-enriched uranium (LEU) or fabricate it into
fuel rods; commit to an additional protocol to
its IAEA safeguards agreement and to Code 3.1 of
the subsidiary arrangements to the agreement,
which would provide the maximum level of
transparency; and allow the IAEA to make snap
inspections of undeclared facilities. This offer
was intended to address the West's concerns
regarding the nature of Iran's nuclear program
by ensuring that no enriched uranium would be
diverted to a nuclear weapons program. It also
would have facilitated the recognition of Iran's
right to enrichment under the NPT. In exchange
for these Iranian commitments, the Iranian
nuclear file at the IAEA would be normalized,
and Iran would have broader political, economic,
and security cooperation with the European
Union. Furthermore, Iran was interested in
securing fuel for the research reactor in Tehran
and was ready to ship its enriched uranium to
another country for fabrication into fuel
rods."
The Bush administration refused
everything. Mousavian recalls "a meeting I had at
the time with French Ambassador to Iran Francois
Nicoullaud, he told me, "For the US, the
enrichment in Iran is a red line which the
European Union cannot cross."
So "the West
was not interested in solving the nuclear issue.
Rather, the West wanted to compel Iran to forgo
its enrichment program completely." This could
only lead Tehran to "change its nuclear diplomacy
and accelerate its enrichment program, as it
sought self-sufficiency in nuclear fuel."
"Zero stockpile," anyone?
Fast
forward to February 2010. Tehran proposed,
"keeping its enrichment activities below 5% in
return for the West providing fuel rods for the
Tehran reactor. The West refused this offer."
Then, in May 2010, "Iran reached a deal
with Brazil and Turkey to swap its stockpile of
LEU for research reactor fuel. The deal was based
on a proposal first drafted by the Obama
administration with Brazilian and Turkish
officials under the impression that they had the
blessing of Washington to negotiate with Iran.
Regrettably, the United States trampled on their
success by rejecting the plan; the UN Security
Council subsequently passed additional sanctions
against Iran."
Every unbiased observer
following the Iranian nuclear dossier knows these
facts. Another flash forward, to September 2011,
"when Iran had completely mastered 20% enrichment
and had a growing stockpile, it proposed stopping
its 20%-enrichment activities and accepting
Western-provided fuel rods for the Tehran reactor.
Once again, the West declined and made it
necessary for the Iranians to move toward
producing their own fuel rods."
Moving on
to this year's talks in Istanbul and Baghdad,
Mousavian stresses, "with each blockage and
punitive Western action, Iran further advances its
nuclear program."
And it gets worse; "A
comparison of the June 19 statement in Moscow by
Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign policy chief and
lead negotiator for the P5+1, with her April 14
Istanbul statement reveals a major difference. The
P5+1 is now giving more emphasis to Iran's
compliance with its international obligations,
namely, UN Security Council resolutions, rather
than focusing on the country's obligations under
the NPT. This is a clear setback from the Istanbul
position. It indicates a focus on suspension of
Iran's enrichment activities, a demand that has
been a deal breaker since 2003."
The
bottom line is "not only has the West pushed Iran
to seek self-sufficiency, but at every juncture,
it has tried to deprive Iran of its inalienable
right to enrichment. This has simply propelled
Iran to proceed full throttle toward mastering
nuclear technology."
The conclusion is
inevitable; "The progress of Iran's nuclear
program is the product of Western efforts to
pressure and isolate Iran while refusing to
recognize Iran's rights."
Washington and
its European followers simply can't understand
that "sanctions, isolation, and threats would not
bring Iran to its knees. On the contrary, these
policies have led only to the advancement of
Iran's nuclear program." With even more
devastating sanctions and the "Bomb Iran" fever
turning into an attack, one consequence, says
Mousavian, is assured; "Iran would be likely to
withdraw from the NPT and pursue nuclear weapons."
What makes it even more absurd is that
there is a solution to all this madness:
"To satisfy the concerns of the West
regarding Iran's 20% stockpile, a mutually
acceptable solution for the long term would
entail a 'zero stockpile.' Under this approach,
a joint committee of the P5+1 and Iran would
quantify the domestic needs of Iran for use of
20% enriched uranium, and any quantity beyond
that amount would be sold in the international
market or immediately converted back to an
enrichment level of 3.5%. This would ensure that
Iran does not possess excess 20% enriched
uranium forever, satisfying the international
concerns that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons.
It would be a face-saving solution for all
parties as it would recognize Iran's right to
enrichment and would help to negate concerns
that Iran is pursuing nuclear
weapons."
Will Washington -- and Tel
Aviv -- ever accept it? Of course not. The dogs of
war will keep on barking.
A new
security game
It's also quite refreshing to
examine Iranian analysts' take on Syria.
Mehdi Mohammadi, writing at the IranNuc.IR
website[3] notes "the fear that the Sunni
majority has of a Salafi minority is a very
important, and often censored, reality about the
situation on the ground in Syria. It is the same
reality which has prevented the opposition to
accept any form of negotiations or even free
elections." This fact is absolutely anathema in
Western corporate media's coverage of Syria.
Mohammadi correctly evaluates the
discrepancies among different Muslim Brotherhood
(MB) factions inside Syria; one hardline faction
wants Sharia law; another is convinced the future
of the whole region is essentially at the hands of
the MB anyway, so they are on a mission from God;
but the majority wants to extract as much money as
they can from Saudi Arabia while allied with
France, the US, Sunnis in Lebanon and Jordan;
"this part forms the spine of the armed opposition
in Syria."
The bottom line is that even in
the best-case scenario, the MB "is making a dire
strategic mistake ... Even if Assad's government
falls, the Americans will not allow the Syrian
government to fall into the hands of that part of
the Muslim Brotherhood which seeks to continue and
even give more depth to the existing conflict with
Israel."
Mohammadi also observes, right on
the money, how the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and
Turkey "reached the conclusion that the best way
for preventing Arab Spring developments to serve
Iran's increasing power in the region was to turn
the whole situation into a conflict between
Shi'ites and Sunnis."
Essentially, how
does Tehran see it? According to Mohammadi, "there
is a high degree of confidence that the Syrian
government will not fall in medium term." On top
of it, "it is very unlikely that Russia and China
will reach an agreement with the West over Syria,"
and "even on Iran's nuclear dossier."
So Tehran is betting on the
strategic achievement of a "reliable anti-West
front consisting of Russia and China." His
conclusion; "The strategic equation of the region
as a result of the ongoing developments in Syria
has by no means changed to the detriment of Iran."
In an interview to the Iranian Diplomacy
(IRD) website[4] former ambassador and strategic
analyst Mohammad Farhad Koleini comments on how
"some Arab countries, which have very bleak
records in the field of human rights, have joined
hands with the United States in the current
equation in Syria in order to define a new
security game. This security game, however, has
been so mismanaged that it will
certainly taint the international image of the
United States."
Koleini notes that as the
West goes for a new security arrangement in the
Mediterranean, Moscow is trying "not to allow the
West to impose its geopolitical monopoly." So the
Russian approach to Syria "is not necessarily
focused on what is actually going on inside the
country, but it stems from a regional package and
how Moscow aims to regulate that package in
relation to its interactions with the West."
That explains why Russia "will never allow
Western states to impose a no-fly zone region over
Syria." Is this confrontation? Not really; "Russia
is doing its best to avoid outright confrontation
by any means. China has also shown all along the
way that it is following the same policy."
Mehdi Sanaei, the director of the Russia
Studies Group at the University of Tehran and the
director of the Iran and Eurasia Research Center
(IRAS), writing at the Tabnak News website[5] goes
way deeper; Moscow is now working under
"unprecedented suspicion of the United States'
goals and intentions in the Middle East and
Eurasia."
So forget about the famous
"reset" between Washington and Moscow.
Sanaei refers to the famous foreign policy
article[6] published by Putin on the eve of the
Russian presidential election: "Putin took a
direct shot at the United States by accusing
Washington of deception and abuse of the UN
structure and resolutions, applying double
standards to various global issues in different
countries, as well as seeking its own interests
under the cover of advocating democracy."
Sanaei also correctly describes how
Russian analysts see the Obama administration's
foreign policy as "based on two theories:
'ultimate realism,' and 'new liberalism.' As a
result, the Americans actually believe that world
countries are simply divided into the United
States' friends and enemies. Hostile countries,
therefore, should be weakened and their presence
in global and regional strategic arenas should be
limited and even suppressed in political, economic
and cultural terms."
So, for Moscow, "a
new wave of the world order has been initiated by
the United States in order to create a new version
of the past unipolar world system. The main
targets of this wave, Moscow maintains, include
North Africa, the Middle East, Iran, Eurasia, and
finally China and Russia."
Koleini, this
time writing for the Tehran Emrooz daily[7],
introduces the Pipelineistan theme in the
Iran-Russia relationship; "Despite its cooperation
with Iran's nuclear energy program, Russia has
been always willing to cut Iran's hand in the
European natural gas market. Therefore, Russia has
been interacting with Turkey and certain Eastern
European countries on the Blue Stream project.
This proves beyond any doubt that Russia is trying
to take the lead in engineering security structure
in Europe through its energy policy and reduce
Europe's reliance on other energy sources."
All this while "trying to play a balancing
role in Iran's nuclear case."
Koleini also
outlines the main challenge to the "Eurasian
policy" laid out by Putin before his election;
"The point is that the West is designing new
political games, especially in Central Asia to
give new problems to Russia and divert Moscow's
attention from Eurasia to traditional spheres of
the former Soviet Union."
Egypt and
Iran kiss and make up
Iranian intellectuals
are carefully monitoring neighboring Turkey.
Turkey and Caucasus expert Elyas Vahedi observes
how "the Turkish government came up with such
concepts as 'neither state religion, nor religious
state,' 'secular government, not secular man,'
'civilizing the constitution,' 'democratic
openness/Kurdish openness/Alawite openness,'
and 'civil control and supervision over the army'
and has been using them to strengthen and maintain
the political clout of the Justice and Development
Party."
And of course, before the Arab Spring,
all talk was about "zero problems with our
neighbors" and Turkey's "strategic depth"
doctrine.
But now that Turkey is stuck in
Syria, the AKP government is "trying to justify
its failure by claiming that the policy of
minimizing problems with neighboring countries has
just entered is second phase ... Turkey believes
that the main feature of the second version of
this policy is interaction with people in
neighboring countries rather than interaction with
their governments."
It simply doesn't
hold, says Vahedi: "This viewpoint, despite some
shortcomings, was somehow justifiable in some
countries like Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, but this
is not the case in Syria." Besides, Ankara
"remained silent toward the predicament of people
in Bahrain, under the pretext that political
protests in Bahrain are not popular."
Moreover, Turkey's foreign policy "has
also nurtured speculations that Ankara has joined
the Shi'ite-Sunni conflict which has been fostered
by the West. The damage that this notion will do
to Turkey's regional and international standing
and prestige will be too costly for Ankara."
Vahedi sees Turkey, as well as Saudi
Arabia and Qatar, as just following the West,
which is leading from behind, Obama-style. Turkey
"has apparently read the West's mind and is trying
to accept that role on behalf of the West in
return for certain concessions." But it won't work
-- as, for instance, facilitating Turkey's
accession to the EU over immense French and German
objections.
Not to mention that Ankara "is
facing scathing criticism from nationalist
figures. They allege that while the rights of
Turks are being ignored in Karabakh as well as in
the Balkans through the oversight of the Western
powers, the government of Turkey has made
defending the rights of the Syrian people its
first and foremost priority."
Ali Akbar
Asadi, from the International Relations Dept at
the University of Allameh Tabatabaei, expands on
the key event of the next few weeks: the renewed
diplomatic relationship between Iran and Egypt --
which is drawing Washington's unmitigated wrath;
the State Department, in a childish move, is even
saying that Iran "does not deserve" to host the
summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in
Tehran, which will be attended by Egypt's
President Mohamed Morsi.[8]
Asadi goes to
the jugular -- the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
petro-monarchies are terrified that "Egypt may
renew relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran
or even enter into strategic relations with
Turkey, thus working to undermine the influence
and clout of the GCC in the new balance of
regional power."
So the GCC is doing what
it usually does; showering a bit of cash. "They
want to keep Egypt, as a big and important Arab
political player, on their own side."
Besides, they are demanding from Morsi and
the MB that "they do not take any step to export
their revolution and activate affiliates" of the
MB in the GCC. And they "expect Cairo to avoid
adopting a new approach to strengthening Hamas
against Fatah, helping Gaza and the Palestinian
population there, and taking an adamant stance
against the Israeli regime."
The GCC
policy, supported by the West and Israel, is "to
keep Egypt entangled in its domestic challenges"
and thus unable to exercise its "historical claim
to leadership of the Arab world."
This is
just a sample of the level of intellectual
discussion going on in Iran. Compared to the
bombing hysteria in Tel Aviv and Washington, it
does look like it's coming from Mars.
Notes:
1.
An
Obama Visit to Israel Could Stall Iran Attack,
Bloomberg, August 21.
2. See
armscontrol.org/
3.
See
www.irannuc.ir/
4.
See
www.irdiplomacy.ir/
5.
See
www.tabnak.ir/
6.
See
Russia
and the changing world, RIANOVOSTI
7. See
www.tehrooz.com
8.
US
says Iran doesn't deserve to host summit of Non
Aligned Movement, Washington Post, August 21.
Pepe Escobar is the roving correspondent
for Asia Times. His regular column, "The Roving Eye," is widely read. He
is an analyst for the online news channel Real News. He argues that the
world has become fragmented into "stans" -- we are now living an
intestinal war, an undeclared global civil war. He has published three
books on geopolitics, including the spectacularly-titled “Globalistan:
How the Globalised World Is Dissolving Into Liquid War”.
His latest book is "Obama Does Globalistan."