Original Here
Translated from Russian by Kristina Rus
The situation in Debaltsevo may overturn all Minsk agreements
During the entire Minsk negotiations
Ukrainian General staff disinformed Poroshenko about the situation in
Debaltsevo, and the most important trump card in the hands of the
President of Ukraine turned out to be a bluff. UAF was not able to crack
open the cauldron, and it has turned into the most sticking point of
negotiations, which may turn everything agreed upon in Minsk upside
down.
Poroshenko's perception of reality was
ultimately shattered by his propaganda trip to Kramatorsk in the company
of the chief of the General staff Muzhenko and a French
philosopher-Russophobe Bernard-Henri Levy. The President of Ukraine is a
man not too brave, very emotional and gullible. What was originally
conceived as "pumping" of Western public opinion with all the classic
moves of PR campaigns, turned into a psychological trap for himself.
The Minister of Defense and head of
General staff, spurred by Turchynov, had promised the President to carry
out the operation, which will deblock Debaltsevo, and at the same time
"will pay back for Kramatorsk." When Poroshenko was already flying to
Minsk, he was convinced that it is enough to buy some time and the
attack on Logvinovo will end in complete victory, and he will get a new
starting position for negotiations. Throughout the entire night Poroshenko checked for updates from his General staff, but victory did not come. It hasn't come by morning, and a light bulb went off: something is not right, the cauldron does exist! Although he has already for 10 hours told respected people that it did not.
One can only guess about the motives of
the security block of Ukraine for disorienting and misinforming their
Commander In Chief. The dominant conspiracy theory: Turchynov, actually
managing the security block, thus was buying time, following the general
American line. More down to earth and realistic version: it was a
traditional (of all times and all peoples) aspiration of parquet
generals to please and ward off accusations, glossing over reality.
Considering the general panic mood, combined with an unbridled
propaganda, it is much more likely than a transatlantic conspiracy about
Debaltsevo cauldron. The Ukrainian command also doesn't quite
understand what is happening. There is no connection with some units for more than a week,
and if there is, it boils down mainly to cries for help and heated
exchanges about "who is to blame". The chain of misinformation may well
start from the very bottom, gradually accumulating "meat". And to treat
any information in a favorable light is a very common mistake of bad
scouts and analysts. The past six months revealed much about the
strategists of the Ukrainian General staff.
All night from Wednesday to Thursday UAF
tried to exert pressure upon the entire front line. A formation of two
thousand from Svetlodarsk, which was assembled by UAF for almost a week,
went head on to the strongholds and minefields of NAF at Logvinovo, but
the militia has also strengthened this position in recent days. NAF
even managed to transfer significant reserves to Uglegorsk. As a result
an attack on Logvinovo from two sides (there was also an attack from
Debaltsevo, but very unconvincing) was stopped only by the morning. By
this moment Poroshenko got his own localized apocalypse.
UAF also tried to attack directly from
Lugansk through the infamous village of Schastye, simultaneously firing
on the city from MLRS, which has not happened for six months. UAF
command, as it turned out later, believed that LPR units were too busy
near Debaltsevo and Bakhmut highway, that supposedly weakened defense of
the direct road to Lugansk (this is, again, another demonstration of
the low level of Ukrainian intelligence and strategic analysis).
Battalion "Azov" again imitated the offensive on the coastal route
through the neutral zone with the same results, as a few days ago. These people are generally more prone to simulate turbulent activity than to thoughtful action.
Where UAF is not capable of real
activity, the pressure was carried out using MRLS and heavy weapons. For
example, Peski, Opytnoye, Donetsk itself, Gorlovka, Yenakievo,
Makeevka, Dokuchayevsk, and Dzerzhinsk were heavily shelled.
Vladimir Putin, appearing to the press
after the talks, openly called on the Ukrainian side to allow troops in
Debaltsevo to surrender, or to arrange an organized exit. Poroshenko
wanted to turn the situation around Debaltsevo into his almost only
trump card, and in the end it became a monstrous failure. In fact,
regardless of what and in what language is written in the agreement of
the contact group, Debaltsevo cauldron may turn into a huge mass grave
in the next two days, because none of the demoralized generals (as
Poroshenko himself) will give an order to surrender. And to organize a
controlled exit of the Ukrainian troops from the encirclement in such a
short time is impossible. Soldiers are not concentrated in any one
place, but scattered in groups by checkpoints, many without
communications, without commanders and without ammo. Even if they can
scavenge some food at homesteads, no one will bring them ammo or medical
supplies. In the steppes there is dirt and slush, to detour the
positions of the militia on the road to Logvinovo through fields is
impossible, even if there was fuel. Militia doesn't even need to use
heavy weaponry, it is enough to gradually cut off one checkpoint from
the another.
After the defeat of Ukrainian attack on
Logvinovo a real danger emerged to get a second cauldron in Svetlodarsk,
which would trap this other "deblocking unit", that was built up over a
week. Another thing is that it is problematic to create a new
operational encirclement of a large formation in two days, and any
offensive action by NAF will now be associated with hysterical
information uproar in Ukraine, although UAF themselves have failed at
Uglegorsk, Logvinovo, and now of Svetlodarsk. Only officers and soldiers
can explain to the Ukrainian public that "a cauldron - is no good", but
if they start talking, it will seem more like a riot, and in a
hysterical atmosphere no one will listen.
It is interesting, that a new offensive on Logvinovo was started by UAF immediately after the announcement of the results of Minsk talks,
sometime around noon. Commander Semen Semenchenko - one of the most
active "Twitter warriors" - said that the Ukrainians had already taken
Logvinovo and are "carrying out a sweep". In reality, the situation
remained exactly what it was, a new attack on "cauldron lid" is purely
political in nature.
Thus, a small village Logvinovo on the highway Debaltsevo - Artemovsk turned for Poroshenko into a "new airport", only now these attacks also have a purely military, practical value.
Poroshenko will be now learning about
the difficult reality with apparent difficulty and reluctance. For him
this reality, among other things, is dotted with various "red lines"
which he can't cross even verbally. The military situation had become a
taboo, although it remains a key part of the agenda. Even the questions of the political status can
be brushed off, creating "joint commissions" including representatives
from DPR and LPR, but the front line requires immediate decisions.
Sometimes everything depends not on big ideas and global plays, but
simply on the human qualities of a particular politician or officer. But
a commander in chief of the Ukrainian army, alas, got this position as a
figure of compromise and was controllable from the start. He, as a
person, may want to achieve something. To preserve peace in Europe, for
example. But it is beyond the range of circumstances and human power.
Debaltsevo cauldron has evolved from a
military operation of a local value into the main factor of political
settlement. What will happen there in the next few days (or rather, what
steps will Kiev take to change the situation) will determine the
further balance of power. To demonstrate DPR and LPR in the face of
Europeans as "wild barbarians", and Russia as the aggressor will not
work anymore. You were given options - it's your choice. Even
Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky were brought to you for negotiations, and in
the end we got a vague paper signed by Kuchma, whose position at the
moment is - a retiree. "Ratified verbally" certain agreements - it's
such a fresh and new phenomenon in international diplomacy that all
textbooks should be rewritten.
To seriously discuss the details of
pulling the heavy artillery to some distance from the front line
(lines?) is pointless. As well as to discuss clause-by-clause an
agreement, from which there will not even be a memory left in a short
time. Yes, the Ukrainian troops will be pulled from the actual line, but
Ukraine's control over the border with Russia can only be restored
after a constitutional reform, guaranteeing new status for Donetsk and
Lugansk. That is, "money - in the morning, chairs - in the evening".
A much more important question, is how
long can the state of "no peace, no war" hold. To predict it now is
extremely difficult, it all depends on many factors, including purely
private, invisible to the naked eye. Most of these factors are now in
Kiev. What will happen to public opinion, if the losses exceed all
reasonable limits? When and on what conditions will Debaltsevo
surrender? How hard will the Parliament groups fight against the bills
on the new status of Donbass, and how will Poroshenko cope with it?
There is a myriad of these key elements. Especially that in reality
there is no monitoring mechanism for the removal of heavy weapons from
either side. OSCE can not monitor the ceasefire: tanks and 80 mm mortars
will remain at the contact line, which do not fall under the category
of "heavy artillery", and in an urban setting - they are terrible,
deadly weapons. A mine doesn't break the asphalt, but bounces from it.
Shrapnel flies in all directions parallel to the ground, and people lose
their legs.
All this looks like a new calm before a big war.
